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I. INTRODUCTION
In April of 2006, XM Satellite Radio, Inc. (XM) launched a new device entitled
the "Inno."1 The Inno allows XM subscribers to listen to live satellite radio
broadcasts, record individual songs that are played during those live broadcasts,
and transfer digital music files to the device for listening.2 The Inno has caught
the ire of the recording industry because it allows the user to record permanent
digital copies of individual songs, and to create permanent libraries of those sound
recordings.3
On May 16, 2006, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
filed suit on behalf of the major record labels against XM over the marketing and
promotion of the Inno and the "XM+ MP3" service.4 The plaintiffs allege that
use of the device with the XM + MP3 service infringes on the plaintiffs'
copyrights, the Inno induces users to engage in copyright infringement, XM is
contributorily liable for the infringement by Inno users, and that XM is in
violation of numerous other copyright laws.' The plaintiffs seek a declaratory
judgment that the device infringes on the plaintiffs' copyrights, an injunction
barring the production and distribution of the Inno, and damages from XM for
the infringement by Inno users.' On the other hand, XM and its supporters argue
that XM is immune from any copyright infringement actions related to use of the
Inno because federal copyright law prohibits suits against those who manufacture,

' The Inno, manufactured by Pioneer Electronics, officially debuted at the 2006 Consumer
Electronics Show in Las Vegas, garnering numerous awards. See Press Release, PR Newswire, XM
Satellite Radio Wins Top Honors at the 2006 Consumer Electronics Show (Apr. 15, 2007), http://
xmradio.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=pressreleases&item=1 137.
2 PIONEER, INNO USER GUIDE 26-78 (2006), available at http://www.xmradio.com/pdf/
hardware.support/pioneer/inno/userguide.pdf. XM also markets and sells two similar devices
called the "Helix" and the "NeXus," which are both manufactured by Samsung Electronics. See
Portable XM Radios, http://www.xmradio.com/xmp3/index.xmc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 11, Atlantic Recording
Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, No. 06 CV 3733 (DAB) (GWG) (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2006) [hereinafter
Complaint].
4 Id. at 1. The actual plaintiffs are Atlantic Recording Corporation, BMG Music, Capitol
Records Inc., Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc., Interscope Records, Motown Record Company,
L.P., Sony BMG Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Inc., Virgin Records America, Inc., and
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. Id.
6 Id. at 15-32.
6

Id.at 32-33.
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distribute, or import digital audio recording devices XM contends that
the Inno
8
meets the statutory requirements of a digital audio recording device.
The current litigation between the RIAA and XM encompasses numerous
legal and policy issues. Nonetheless, all of these issues hinge on one central issue:
Whether use of the Inno's recording function actually infringes on the plaintiffs'
copyrights. Accordingly, the purpose of this Note is to discuss and explore that
question.
Part II of this Note provides basic background information on the Inno's
functions and disputed features, describes how the Inno has been marketed to the
public, and explains the applicable copyright statutes and primary case law
interpreting those statutes. Part II concludes by discussing the contentions put
forward by both sides of the XM litigation regarding whether the statutory
immunities of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA) apply to XM,
and whether XM has created a service that illegally distributes the plaintiffs'
copyrighted works. Part III of the Note analyzes, in light of the text and
legislative history of the AHRA and Digital Performance Rights Act of 1995
(DPRA), whether the Inno used with XM's services is in fact a digital audio
recording device or a cleverly disguised digital music distribution service. Part III
also articulates some of the problems within the AHRA, and suggests potentially
beneficial amendments that should be made to the AHRA.
In conclusion, this Note finds that the Inno fails to meet the definition of a
digital audio recording device under the AHRA. Therefore, XM cannot claim the
protections of federal law provided to distributors of digital audio recording
devices. Nonetheless, this Note will also find that XM is not in violation of its
statutory license to perform the plaintiffs' works because the Inno used with the
XM broadcast does not constitute an unauthorized digital music distribution
service run by XM. In light of the probable outcome of this litigation, as well as
the outcome of prior litigation, this Note ultimately concludes that Congress
should amend the AHRA to provide clear guidance to manufacturers of digital
audio recording devices as well as to ensure that copyright owners are properly
compensated and protected against illegal copying of their works.

7 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, 13-14, Atlantic
Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, No. 06 CV 3733 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y.July 17,2006) [hereinafter
Memorandum]; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Consumer Electronics Assoc. & Home Rerecording
Rights Coalition in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-18, Atlantic Recording Corp.
v. XM Satellite Radio, No. 06 CV 3733 (DAB) (July 17, 2006) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
' Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1-2, 14-17.
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II. BACKGROUND

This Part will begin by providing a brief overview of the history of XM
Satellite Radio and satellite radio technology in general. Next, the basic functions
and key features of the Inno, as well as XM's marketing strategies of the device,
will be discussed. Finally, this section will conclude by introducing the copyright
laws pertinent to the XM litigation, laying out judicial interpretations of certain
key portions of these laws, and reviewing the legal arguments put forth by both
sides of the XM case.
A. XM SATELLITE RADIO

XM was incorporated in 1992 in response to the creation of a new medium for
broadcasting radio. 9 Unlike traditional radio stations that broadcast an analog AM
or FM signal, XM broadcasts an all digital signal"° through the use of satellites."
XM offers a variety of programming options, including several genres of music,
premium sports, comedy, talk radio, and traffic and weather reporting on over
170 channels.' In order to receive the XM signal and listen to the broadcast, an
individual must own an XM Radio and pay a monthly subscription fee.' 3
Currently, XM has approximately seven million subscribers across the United
States.14

' XM Corporate Information, http://www.xmradio.com/about/corporate-information.xmc
(last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
Io See About XM Radio, http://www.xmradio.com/help/faqs/about.xmc (last visited Apr. 15,
2007). When information is transmitted using analog methods, the signal is subject to heavy
degradation and distortion. Mark G. Tratos, The Impact of the Internet & Digital Media on the
EntertainmentIndusty, 127 P.L.I. PAT. COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS & LITERARY PROP. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 127, 147 (2006). When a signal is digitized, however, a nearly perfect replica
of the signal is transmitted. Id. at 148.
11 XM is one of only two companies that currently hold a license to broadcast satellite radio.
XM Corporate Information, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 Memorandum, supra note 7, at 4. XM broadcasts an encrypted (protected) digital signal that

can only be decrypted and heard through an XM radio that has been activated. Id.Currently, the
monthly subscription rate is $12.95/month for one radio, and $6.99/month for additional radios
under the family plan. XM Radio - Fast Facts, http://www.xmradio.com/about/fast-facts/index.
xmc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
14 Id.
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B. THE INNO

The Inno is a portable handheld device that allows users to enjoy XM satellite
radio broadcasts virtually anywhere within the United States and surrounding
territories. 5 With the Inno, users can listen to a live broadcast on any of XM's
channels, as well as receive sports scores, stock quotes, and various other
information.' 6 In addition, the "TuneSelect" feature allows listeners to be notified
whenever their favorite artist or song is currently being played on any XM
channel. 7
The Inno's most innovative, and most controversial, feature is its ability to
record individual songs and other programming from a live XM broadcast. With
the touch of a button, Inno users can record individual songs directly from an
XM broadcast. 8 Even if a song has already begun playing, a listener can record
the entire song because the device automatically stores the last ten minutes of the
broadcast on the Inno's internal memory.' 9 Similar to a VCR or Personal Video
Recorder (PVR), the Inno allows the user to schedule a recording session on a
particular channel at a predetermined time.2 ° Songs and other content recorded
on the Inno cannot be transferred from the device, and Inno users can only listen
to recorded songs and content if they have an active XM subscription.2' The
Inno also allows users to transfer their own digital music files to the device for
subsequent listening.' Users can even bookmark songs that they have listened
to during an XM broadcast for purchase on the "XM + Napster" service.23

15

XM Service & Billing Options - FAQs for XM Service and Billing, http://www.xmradio.

com/help/faqs/availability.xnc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
16 PIONEER, supra note 2, at 26-28, 31-32.
17 Id. at 29-30.

s Id. at 33-34.
9 Id. at 33. The device must be tuned to the channel where the song was playing once the song
began playing. Id.
20 Id. at 35-36.
21 Memorandum, supra note 7, at 6; PIONEER, supra note 2, at 37.
22 PIONEER, supra note 2, at 59. The Inno will only play MP3, WMA, or digital music files
purchased from the "XM + Napster" service. Id. For an explanation of the XM + Napster service,
see id., at 49-60; XM + Napster -Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.xmradio.com/napster/
faq.xmc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007); Jens Adrian, Popular Digital Audio Formats!, http://www.
cdburner.ca/digital-audio-formats-article/popular-digital-audio-formats.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2007) (describing digital audio formats).
23

PIONEER, supra note 2, at

45.
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MARKETING OF THE INNO

XM touts the Inno as a portable satellite radio that allows for easy recording,
playback, and management of the user's favorite music.24 XM purports that the
Inno's features make it superior to the iPod, which is currently the most popular
digital music player.2 XM currently markets the Inno as part of its "XM2go"
product line, emphasizing that Inno users can enjoy XM broadcasts and content
anywhere and at anytime.26 Since its initial unveiling at the 2006 Consumer
Electronics Show (CES) held in Las Vegas, Nevada, the Inno has received
numerous awards and accolades within the consumer electronics industry.27
D. APPLICABLE COPYRIGHT LAW

To determine whether the Inno used with the XM broadcast is permissible,
the XM court will have to consider and interpret two pieces of legislation. First,
the AHRA statutory language and legislative history provide guidance on digital
audio recording devices and the liability issues surrounding such devices.
Additionally, both the District Court and Ninth Circuit decisions in the RIAA v.
DiamondMultimedia litigation provide in-depth discussions and interpretations of
the AHRA. Finally, the DPRA defines the digital performance right in sound
recordings, as well as dictates the rights and requirements for satellite radio
companies to broadcast copyrighted sound recordings.
1. Audio Home RecordingAct of 1992.
a. HistoricalBackground. Prior to 1972, federal copyright law did not
protect copyright owners from the unauthorized duplication of their sound
recordings.28 In order to protect themselves, sound recording copyright owners

24 Examples of some marketing phrases used include: "Hear It, Click It, Save It ....

Your

playlist will never be the same"; "Record with the touch of a button"; "Schedule recordings in
advance. Never miss your favorite programs"; "Store up to 50 hours of XM"; "Listen to the songs
you want to hear when you want to hear them"; "Create playlists using both your own music files
and recorded XM songs"; "Bookmark songs for easy online purchase." Pioneer Inno, http://www.
xmradio.com/innodemo/index.xmc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
21 See Complaint, supra note 3, at 2 ("It's not an iPod, it's the Mothership.").
26 The Pioneer Inno, http://www.xmradio.com/pioneerinno/index.xmc (last visited Apr. 15,
2007).
27 The Inno won the "CNET Best of CES 2006 - People's Voice" award, and the "PC
Magazine CES Last Gadget Standing" award for the 2006 CES. See Cnet.com, Best of CES Awards
- CES 2006, http://www.cnet.com/4520-11405_1-6398234-l.html?tax=txt (last visited Apr. 15,
2007); linners of Last Gadget StandingAnnounced, PC MAG., Mar. 7, 2006, available at http://www.

pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,1909033,00.asp.
28 Lewis Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the
Formationof CopyrghtPokg, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 497, 499 (1998).
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had to resort to state civil and criminal laws to obtain relief.29 Congress finally
responded by enacting the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, which
prohibited the unauthorized duplication of a recorded performance or rendition
of a copyrighted musical composition. 3°
Notwithstanding the passage of the Sound Recording Amendment, it still
remained unclear whether home recording of sound recordings constituted
copyright infringement.31 "'Private copying' or '[home recording]' is the practice
of individuals making tapes at home of their own or friends records or taping
broadcasts of recorded music off the radio."3 2 Traditionally, most home
recording took place on analog recording technology, such as audio cassette
tapes.33 This did not worry the recording industry because the inherent
characteristics of analog technology limited the effects of copyright infringement
resulting from home recording.34
However, in 1990, Sony Corporation and its subsidiaries were sued by
songwriters and publishers in a class action to prohibit digital audio recording
and
technology from entering the United States. 3' The Digital Audio Tape (DAT)
DAT recorder, introduced by Sony and Philips Electronics in the mid-1980s,
made it possible for consumers to digitally record and copy music. 36 DAT

2 Id.at 499.
0 Id. This legislation protects sound recordings fixed after February 1972 under federal
by state an-d cri' i l I ...
I)
Iroectd
.. .
170
_
,,
p,- r ,
11,1,hi,
-,-- ,11 ,
,- W- -,qh
against unauthorized duplication and distribution. Id
3

Id. at 499-500. Copare H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 6 (1971), repintedin-1971 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1566, 1572 (stating that the grant of a limited copyright in sound recordings was not designed to
prohibit home recording of sound recordings from broadcasts, tapes, or records for private use), and
Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Dist., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that
Congress did not intend to prohibit individuals from making home recordings of copyrighted
materials), with Melville B. Nimmer, CopyrightLiabikhforAudio Home Recording: Dispelhng the Betamax
Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982) (contending that under copyright law there was no exemption
from copyright liability for audio home recording).
32 Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 28, at 497.
There is an important distinction between music piracy and home taping.
Music piracy is illegal because of its 'for-profit' aspect, and the practice has been
illegal since copyright protection was extended to sound recordings in 1971.
However, the legality of the home taping of a legitimately purchased audio
recording was a long-standing debate.
Aaron L. Melville, Note, The Future of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: Has it Survived the
Milknnium Bug?, 7 B.U.J. ScI. & TECH. L. 372, 377 (2001).
13 Gary S. Lutzker, Dat's all Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991 Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 145, 153 (1992).
34 Id
35 Id.at 145-46, 164-71; Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 28, at 500.

' See Melville, supra note 32, at 378 ("DAT recorders permit users to make successive copies
of tapes with virtually none of the degradation in sound quality that occurs with analog copies.").
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technology troubled the recording industry because, for the cost of a blank digital
audio tape, consumers could use a DAT recorder to make a perfect replica of the
original CD.37 The industry believed that DAT technology would serve as a
widespread mechanism for copyright infringement,38 and as a result, severely
diminish the revenues of recording companies and artists.39
The Sony case, which could have directly resolved the legality of home
recording, was eventually settled in 199. 40 Part of the settlement agreement
required that Sony and the other defendants agree to cooperate with the plaintiffs
to establish legislation that would address the issue of home copying and create
a royalty payment system for those who wish to manufacture and distribute digital
audio recording equipment and recording media.41 These efforts eventually led
to the passage of the AHRA.42
b. AHRA Provisions. The AHRA was enacted as a compromise between
43
consumers, the consumer electronics industry, and the recording industry.
According to the Senate, "[t]he purpose of [the AHRA] is to guarantee the right
of consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for
their private, noncommercial use."' The AHRA, which amended chapter ten of
the Copyright Act,45 has three primary purposes.46 First, it allows for the sale and
distribution of digital audio recording devices for home use within the United
States, with certain limitations.4" Second, the AHRA provides compensation to
recording artists and copyright owners for potential lost revenues due to the use
of this technology.48 Third, the AHRA provides immunity from copyright
infringement suits for those who produce, import, or distribute digital audio

" Melville, supra note 32, at 378-79.
38 BRUCE P. KELLER &JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE

9:2 (5th ed. 2001).
39

Id.

4o Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 28, at 500-01; Lutzker, supra note 33, at 164-65.
41 Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 28, at 501; Lutzker, supra note 33, at 170 n.134.
42 Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 28, at 501; see also Lutzker, supra note 33, at 184-89
(discussing the passage of the AHRA).
41 Melville, supra note 32, at 379. In fact, the AHRA was not drafted by Congress. Lutzker,
supra note 33, at 180. The provisions and language of the AHRA are the result of extended
negotiations between those who have a large financial interest in the legislation, including "the record
industry (producers), the songwriters and music publishers (creators and their agents), and the
consumer electronics industry (manufacturers, distributors, and retailers)." Id.
" Melville, supra note 32, at 379 n.61 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-294, at 30 (1992)).
41 S. REP. No. 102-294, at 1-2 (1992).
2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
47 Id.
48 Id.
4

§ 8B.01 [C]
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recording devices and media, as well as for consumers who employ the
technology for noncommercial purposes.49
Under the AHRA, a "digital audio recording device" is a device distributed to
individuals that has a digital recording function designed or marketed for the
primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a digital audio copied recording
for private use.5 0 A "digital audio copied recording" is a reproduction in a digital
recording format of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made
1
directly from another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission.
A "digital musical recording" is a material object (i) containing only sounds and
material, statements, or instructions incidental to those sounds, fixed in a digital
recording format, and (ii) from which the sounds and material can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. 2
Manufacturers of digital audio recording devices are required to implement
certain copy controls within the devices that are to be distributed within the
United States. 3 Specifically, all digital audio recording devices must comply with
the Serial Copy Management System (SCMS).5 4 SCMS is a technology that
prevents users of digital audio recording devices from making second-generation
To ensure that each device meets SCMS
copies of an audio recording. 5
standards, each manufacturer or importer of a digital audio recording device must
gain permission from the Secretary of Commerce in order to lawfully sell their
devices within the United States. 6 Moreover, it is unlawful for anyone to import,
manufacturer, or distribute any device, or offer any service withi the United
States, whose primary purpose is to circumvent any SCMS program. 7
To offset the potential economic losses that the recording industry would face
due to widespread home recording, Congress devised a royalty system to

'9 Id. § 8B.07[C].
'o 17 U.S.C. 5 1001(3) (2000).
5" 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1).
52 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5).
53 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
54

Id

s Melville, supra note 32, at 380-81. SCMS technology
permits the recorder to make unlimited first generation copies of original
prerecorded material but prohibits the re-copying of those first generation
copies. The SCMS functions by encoding every copied tape [or other digital
recording] with an inaudible signal that, when detected by a SCMS-enabled
device, prevents a copy of that copy from being made.

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 1002(b).
5v 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c).
56

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss2/3

10

Dious: Is Home Recording Dead? A Discussion of the Atlantic v. XM Satell
2007]

RECORDING SATELLITE RADIO

compensate those affected by home recording technology. 8 The AHRA requires
that producers and distributors of audio recording devices pay a certain
percentage of the price of each recording device or medium sold within the
United States to the Register of Copyrights, and that the proceeds be periodically
distributed to recording artists, music publishers, music writers, and copyright
owners.5 9 The manufacturer and or distributor of digital audio recording devices
must notify the Register of Copyrights that they intend to distribute such devices
as well as provide quarterly and annual accounting statements relating to the
distribution of the devices and media that they actually sell.6"
The AHRA also provides limited immunity for producers, importers,
distributors, and users of digital or analog audio recording devices and media.6'
Section 1008 states that one cannot be sued for copyright infringement simply
because they are a manufacturer, importer, or distributor of digital audio
recording devices, even if those who use the devices engage in copyright
infringement.62 Similarly, consumers who use such devices for noncommercial
purposes, such as making personal copies of digital recordings, cannot be sued for
copyright infringement.63 Thus, while § 1008 permits individuals to tape sound
recordings from the radio for purely private purposes, using audio recording
technology for the purpose of reproducing and selling copies of sound recordings
is prohibited.64
c. AHRA Legislaive Histoy. Both the House and Senate reports on the
AHRA provide some understanding as to what recording devices and media
Congress intended the AHRA to cover. The Senate report states that the
definition of digital musical recording (referred to as "audiogram" in the report)
is meant to include "objects commonly understood to embody sound recordings
and their underlying works."65 The Senate report gives examples of digital

17 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000); Melville, supra note 32, at 380.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1004-1005 (2000); Melville, supranote 32, at 380 n.68. Currently, the statutory
rate is 2% for digital recording devices and 3%for digital audio recording media. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1004(a)(1), (b). The statute also provides for royalty rate calculations for digital audio recording
devices that are integrated with or distributed with other devices. 17 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(2). Only the
first person to manufacture and distribute or import and distribute a recording device is required to
pay the royalty. 17 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(1).
60 17 U.S.C. § 1003.
61 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8B.07[C].
62 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000); see also Lutzker, supra note 33, at 160 ("Under the AHRA,
[contributory infringement] is a cause of action that henceforth will be foreclosed to copyright
owners of musical compositions and sound recordings.").
63 17 U.S.C. § 1008; 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 46, § 8B.07 [C] [2]; Lutzker, supra note 33,
at 174.
64 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8B.07[C][2].
65 S.
REP. No. 102-294, at 46 (1992). The Senate report refers to the term "audiogram" instead
58
59
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musical recordings, specifically naming "recorded compact discs (CDs), digital
audio tapes (DATs), audio cassettes and long-playing albums (LPs), and in the
near future, digital compact cassettes (DCCs) and mini-discs (MDs). ' 66 The
primary House report simply states that the AHRA was meant to encompass all
digital recording technologies, and it explicitly lists DATs, DCCs, and Mini-Discs
as examples. 67 The Senate report goes on to state that the incidental material that
can accompany the sound recordings includes text or graphics, such as tide, artist
information, biographies, still photos of the performers, lyrics of the musical
works that are commonly embodied on album covers, CD boxes, and audio
cassette packages.6 1 "Statements or instructions" includes the data used for the
playback of recordings, such as track and timing information so that the audio
player can locate a particular track, as well as subcode information used in the
Serial Copy Management System.69
The statutory definition of digital musical recording explicitly excludes material
objects that contain one or more computer programs.7 0 The Senate report states
that material objects that contain computer programs or databases that are not
incidental to the fixed sounds do not meet the definition of a digital musical
recording.7 ' Similarly, the House report notes that the AHRA expressly excludes
computer programs from the definition of digital musical recording.72
To determine whether devices with both recording and playback functions
constitute digital audio recording devices, the Senate report explains that the
primary purpose
test is applied only
......
th--....-ca
~~~~~
_ to
a..theasrecording
a¢ L^,^ 73function
qn-. _ of the device and
not to all of t
f a-Lres
Lhe
of t"he ,
w iC-ec.
wi
IheL. drafters meant for
"primary purpose" to mean "a purpose that exceeds 50 percent of all purposes. 74
The Senate report further states that "[i] f the 'primary purpose' of the recording
function is to make objects other than digital audio copied recordings, then the
machine or device is not a 'digital audio recording device,' even if the machine or
device is technically capable of making such recordings. 7 ' That report also

of digital musical recording; however, the statute currently uses the term digital musical recording
instead of audiogram. Id. at 45.
66 S. REP. No. 102-294, at 46.
67 H.R. REP. No. 102-873, pt. 1, at 12 (1992), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3582.
68 S. REP. No. 102-294, at 46.
69 Id
70 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (5)(B)(ii) (2000). A digital musical recording can contain statements and
instructions incidental to the fixed sounds as well as those used to bring about the perception,
reproduction, or communication of the fixed sounds of the recording. Id
71 S.
REP. No. 102-294, at 46.
72 H.R. REP. No. 102-873(1), at 17.
73 S. REP. NO. 102-294,
at 47.
74

id

75

Id at 47-48. The report notes that a digital video cassette recorder would not constitute a
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explains that a computer does not constitute a digital audio recording device;
however, a computer peripheral device that has a recording function marketed
for making digital audio copied recordings would fall under the
specifically
76
AHRA.
d. JudicialInterpretationoftbeAHRA: RIAA v. Diamond. Considering all
the interests at stake and the billions of dollars reaped from the sale of audio
recording technology and sound recordings, there has been surprisingly little
litigation concerning the AHRA. RIAA v. DiamondMultimedia Systems was one of
the first cases to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the AHRA. 7 The
Diamond litigation involved the "Rio," a portable digital music player
manufactured by Diamond Multimedia Systems. 78 The Rio allowed users to
transfer digital audio files from their computer to the device for playback. 79 The
Rio played "MP3" files, the most popular digital audio format at the time." ° To
download songs to the Rio, users had to connect the device to their computer
with a cable and use the "Rio Manager" computer software to transfer files to the
device."' The Rio could store approximately one hour of music, and with an
additional flash memory card, the device could store us to an extra hour of
music.8
The device's only output was through an analog signal sent to
headphones connected to the device. 3 The Rio was not capable of duplicating
any of the files stored within its internal memory, nor could it transfer or upload
the files to a computer, another device, or to the internet.8 4 A flash memory card
with MP3 audio files, however, could be removed and inserted for playback into
another Rio."

digital audio recording device because its primary purpose is to make digital video recordings. Id.
at 48. Furthermore, a personal computer does not constitute a digital audio recording device
because the recording function of a computer is designed and marketed for the recording of data
and computer programs. Id
76

Id.

77 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072,1077 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1999) ("There is no precedent (other than the district court's order) to guide the panel's
interpretation of the Act. The Act has only been discussed once in a published opinion by another
federal court, and there, only to explain why it had no effect on the Copyright Act provisions at issue
in that case." (citations omitted)).
71

Id.at 1073.

79 Id.

o Id. at 1074. For a detailed discussion of MP3 and other digital audio formats, see generally
Adrian, supra note 22.
8" Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1075.
82

Id.

83

Id.

4

Id.

85 Id.
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i. DistrictCourt Dedsion. The RIAA filed suit against Diamond in 1998,
seeking to enjoin further manufacture and distribution of the Rio 8 6 and also to
recover the unpaid royalties for the manufacture and distribution of the Rio as
required by the AHRA. 7
Diamond claimed that the Rio was not a digital audio recording device as
defined by the AHRA. 5 According to Diamond, because a computer hard drive
is not a digital musical recording, a device that copies digital audio files from a
computer hard drive (such as the Rio) cannot be a digital audio recording device
because it does not make reproductions from digital musical recordings.8 9
Diamond also argued that the Rio was not a digital audio recording device
because it lacked a digital recording function.9" The company's rationale was that
since the Rio was entirely dependent on a computer to transfer the files to the
device, the device could not independently make recordings, and therefore the Rio
lacked a recording function for AHRA purposes.9'
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, claimed that by manufacturing and
distributing the Rio, Diamond was violating the AHRA.9" They argued that the
Rio was a digital audio recording device because the exclusion of "material
objects . . . in which one or more computer programs are fixed" from the
definition of digital audio recording applied only to objects containing computer
programs, such as CD-ROvs." According to the plaintiffs, this provision was
designed to exclude the copying of CD-ROMs containing incidental audio tracks
from AHRA protection.9 4 They also alleged that the Rio violated the95 AHRA
becrnie it was a dlioital audin recording device lacki-ng a ;C.MS svtem.
The district court ultimately denied the RIAA's injunction request, holding
that (i) the plaintiffs had not established a probability of success on the merits,
and (ii) refusing the injunction would not subject the plaintiffs to irreparable

8' Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624, 625-26
(C.D. Cal. 1998).
87 Diamond,180 F.3d at 1075.
88 Diamond,29 F. Supp. 2d at 628; Lisa M. Needham, A Day in the Lfe of the DigitalMusic Wars:
The RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 26 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 1135, 1147-48 (2000).
89 Diamond,29 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
9 Id.; Needham, supra note 88, at 1148.
91 Diamond,29 F. Supp. 2d at 630-31.
92 Id. at 625.
93 Id at 628.
94 Id
9' Id. at 632. The court dismissed this argument, holding that the Rio was not in violation of
the AHRA's SMCS requirement because the device was incapable of making further generations of
digital copies of the recordings, and because the SCMS requirement would not prevent the Rio from
playing pirated MP3s. Id; Needham, supra note 88, at 1148.
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harm. 96 According to the court, although the plaintiffs had shown that the Rio
probably was a digital audio recording device, they failed to establish a probability
of success because they had not proven that the Rio did not comply with the
AHRA's SCMS requirements.9"
In evaluating whether the Rio was a digital audio recording device, the court
extensively reviewed the statutory language and legislative history of the AHRA.9"
The court concluded that Diamond's construction of both the definition of digital
audio recording device and the computer hard drive exception was contrary to the
spirit and purpose of the AHRA. 99 The court stated that the AHRA's legislative
history supports the view that the exclusion of material objects containing
computer programs from the definition of digital musical recording was intended
to "avoid immunizing the illegitimate copying of computer programs from
liability for copyright infringement."'" In addition, the court reasoned that under
Diamond's interpretation of the definition of digital musical recording, any
recording device transferring digital music files that resided temporarily on a
computer hard drive would not be subject to AHRA regulation, an interpretation
that would "effectively eviscerate the AHRA."'O' Furthermore, the court believed
that nothing within the definition of digital audio recording device indicated that
opuch devices must be able to record independently from a computer.'02 Finally,
the court felt that Diamond's interpretation of the term "recording function"
meant that any device that did not independently make recordings would not be
subject to AHRA regulation, even though the device was capable of making
0 3
digital audio reproductions.
ii. Ninth CircuitDecision. After being rejected by the district court, the
RIAA appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.' °" The Ninth Circuit, after
conducting its own extensive analysis of the text and legislative history of the
AHRA, concluded that the Rio did not qualify as a digital audio recording device,
because it was not able to directly reproduce digital musical recordings or
reproduce them indirectly from a transmission.0

96 Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 632-33.
97 Id.

9" Id at 628-32.
'9 Id. at 629.
100 Id. at 630.
101 Id.
102

Id. at 631.

103

Id

104

Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1072 (9th Cir.

1999).
105 Id at 1079, 1081.
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According to the Ninth Circuit, the AHRA contained a "computer hard-drive
exemption" for certain digital audio recording devices, and this exemption
precluded the Rio from being considered a digital audio recording device.0 6 The
court reasoned that because the AHRA's definition of digital musical recording
excluded material objects "in which one or more computer programs are fixed,"
a computer hard drive must fall outside -the definition of a digital music
recording.'0 7 The court further stated that this exemption applies not only to the
copying of computer programs from hard drives, but to "any copyingfrom a computer
harddrive."' °8 Since the Rio could only copy files from a computer hard drive, the
court determined that the Rio was not be a digital audio recording device
because
09
it did not reproduce files from an actual digital musical recording.'
Instead of simply rejecting the RIAA's request for an injunction based on the
facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit went further and acknowledged the existence
of a significant loophole in the AHRA." ° The court held that any recording device
thatfirstpassesfilesthrough a computer harddrive would not be subject to regulationunder the
AHRA."' According to the court, "[u]nder the plain meaning of [the AHRA's]
definition of digital audio recording devices, computers (and their hard drives) are
not digital audio recording devices because their 'primary purpose' is not to make
digital audio copied recordings."". 2 The primary purpose of the computer the
court stated, is "to run various programs and to record the data necessary to run
those programs and perform various tasks.""' 3
In support of its argument, the Ninth Circuit cited the legislative history of the
AHRA. The court noted that the Senate drafting report states that the personal
computer does not fall within the definition of a digital audio recording device
because the recording function of the computer "is designed and marketed
primarily for the recording of data and computer programs," and not for
recording digital audio copied recordings." 4 The court also pointed out that the
Senate Report states that "[i]f the 'primary purpose' of the recording function is
to make objects other than digital audio copied recordings, then the machine or
device is not a 'digital audio recording device,' even if the machine or device is technicaly
capable of making such recordings."' 15

106 Id. at 1078; Needham, supranote 88, at 1156 n.109.
107 Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1076-78; Needham, supra note 88, at 1156.

log Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1078 (emphasis added).
109 Id.

110Id; Needham, supra note 88, at 1159.
. Diamond,180 F.3d at 1078; Needham, supra note 88, at 1159.
112 Diamond,180 F.3d at 1078.
113

114

Id.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 102-294, at 121 (1992)).

"1 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 102-294, at 121).
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The Ninth Circuit also held that the Rio was not a digital audio recording
device because it could not reproduce a digital musical recording "from a
transmission.""' 6 A performance is transmitted when, through a device or
process, it is communicated beyond the place from which it is sent.1 1 7 The Senate
report states that a radio broadcast is an example of a transmission,"' and a digital
audio recording made from a radio broadcast constitutes a digital audio copied
recording." 9 From these readings of the statute and legislative history, the court
concluded that a device falls under the AHRA "if it can indirectly copy a digital
120
music recording by making a copy from a transmission of that recording.'
Since the Rio could only make copies of sound recordings from a computer hard
drive, the court held that it was12 1incapable of making digital musical recordings
indirectly from a transmission.
In summary, the Ninth Circuit set forth a two-part test to determine whether
a device constitutes a digital audio recording device under the AHRA. Under
their test, for a device to be considered a digital audio recording device, "[it] must
be able to produce, either 'directly' or 'from a transmission,' a 'digital music
recording.' ,122 In addition, the device must have a recording function whose
primary purpose is to make digital audio copied recordings."z Under this test, a
,device that is capable of copying digital audio files only from a computer hard
drive does not constitute a digital audio recording device124under the AHRA, and
therefore is not subject to regulation under the AHRA.
2. DigitalPeformance Rightin Sound RecordingsActof 1995. The 1976 Copyright
Act provided copyright owners with five exclusive rights in their copyrighted
works: the rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly
display their works.'25 Congress specifically excluded an exclusive performance

116 Id.at 1079.
117

Id. Since the term "transmission" was not defined within the AHRA, the court looked to

other portions of the copyright act, as well as the legislative history of the AHRA, to find a suitable
definition for transmission. Id. The court believed that the way the term is used within the AHRA
implies that a transmission is a communication to the public. Id.
118 Id.at 1080 (citing S. REP. No. 102-294, at 119).
119 Id.at 1080-81 (citing S. REP. No. 102-294, at 119).
120

Id. at 1081.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 1076.

123 Id. at 1078.
124 See id.at 1075-81 (discussing why the Rio is not a digital audio recording device).
125

Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C. 5 106

(2000)); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.21[B]; see also id.§ 8.02 (discussing how
reproduction differs from copying and the scope of the reproduction right).
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either
directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture
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right for sound recordings. 26 Congress finally addressed the lack of protection
for the public performance of sound recordings by passing the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA).127 The DPRA
created two rights for copyright owners: (i) a public performance right in sound
recordings for certain digital transmissions, and (ii) a compulsory license for the
digital distribution of sound recordings, also known as "digital phonorecord
128
delivery.'
a. 17 U.S.c 106(6): Performance Right in Sound Recordings. The DPRA
amended § 106 of the Copyright Act by providing copyright owners with the
exclusive right to publicly perform sound recordings by means of a digital audio
transmission. 129 The performance right within 5 106(6) is rather limited in scope,
as it ony applies to sound recordings that are transmitted digitally. 3 ° This means
that live performances of copyrighted works, transmissions of audiovisual works
(movies, television programs, etc.), and transmissions that occur in analog formats

or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying it audible ....To perform or display a work "publicly"
means-(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by
clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive
it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
126 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.21[B]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (giving
copyright owners an exclusive performance for public performances through a digital audio
transmission instead of a comprehensive exclusive performance right as found under § 106(4)); id.
§ 2.10 (discussing sound recordings and the rights surrounding them). The reason for the omission
is that Congress intended to address this issue at a later date. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 46,

8.21 [B].
127 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 104 Pub. L. No. 39, 109 Stat.
336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 46,

8.213].
12s 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.22.
129 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000); H.R. REP. No. 104-274, at 19 (1995); S.REP. No. 104-128, 18

(1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 365; 2 NIMMER & NiMNER, supra note 46, § 8.21[B].
130 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). The Copyright Office, Patent and Trademark Office, and the White
House all recommended that the performance right cover all public performances of sound
recordings, but Congress chose instead to limit the right to digital transmissions. 2 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.21 [B] n.44. Congress made this decision in an effort to recognize the
carefully created performance right agreed to by the affected parties. H.R. REP. 104-274, at 19
(1995); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.21 [B].

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss2/3

18

Dious: Is Home Recording Dead? A Discussion of the Atlantic v. XM Satell
2007]

RECORDING SATELLITE RADIO

(including those made
by AM, FM, and TV stations) are all exempted from
3
DPRA regulation.' '
b. 17 U.S.C. f 1 14: Scope of ExclusivepePformanceRight in Sound Recordings.
While the DPRA finally gave copyright owners an exclusive right in the
performance of sound recordings, albeit a rather limited right, several notable
limitations have been imposed on this right through amendments to § 114 of the
Copyright Act.13
In particular, § 114(d)(1) exempts nonsubscription
transmissions,' 33 most retransmissions of these transmissions, and other
transmissions that Congress deems should not be subject to the performance
right, as long as the transmission of the sound recordings is not part of an
interactive service. 34 An "interactive service" is a service "that enables a member
of the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the
recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether
135
or not as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.'
Section 114(d)(2) subjects subscription digital audio transmissions, 3 6 certain
nonsubscription transmissions, and satellite radio transmissions 13 to a statutory
license if the transmission meets certain requirements. 138 A statutory license

supra note 46, § 8.21 [B].
132 See general#y H.R. REP. No. 104-274 (discussing exclusive performance right granted by the
131 2 NIMMER & NIMMER,

DPRA, and explaining the limitations on that right); S. REP. NO. 104-128 (providing the Senate's
interpretation of the new performance right and its limits). Section 114 was amended in 1997,1998,
2002,2004, and 2006. ActofNovember 13,1997,105 P.L. 80, sec. 3, 5 114, 111 Stat. 1529 (1997);
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 104 P.L. 304, Title IV, sec. 405(a)(1)-(4), § 114, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998); Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,107 P.L. 321, sec. 4, 5(b)-(c), 5 114, 116 Stat. 2781,
2784 (2002); Copyright Royalty and Distribution Act of 2004, sec. 5(c), 108 P.L. 419, § 114,118 Stat.
2362 (2004); Copyright RoyaltyJudges Program Technical Corrections Act, P.L. 109-303, sec. 4(b),
§ 114, 120 Stat. 1481 (2006).
133 "The classic example of such a transmission is a transmission to the general public by a free
over-the-air broadcast station, such as a traditional radio or television station .... S. REP. No. 104128, at 24.
134 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2000).
131 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(7). The term interactive service includes on-line or other services that offer
pay-per-listen," "audio-on-demand," or "celestial jukebox" features, regardless of whether there is
a charge to receive the service. S. REP. No. 104-128, at 35 (1995).
136 A subscription digital audio transmission is a transmission limited to particular recipients for
which subscribers are charged a fee to receive the transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(14); 2 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.22[C][1] [a].
137 The statute states that this section only applies to "preexisting satellite digital audio radio
service." 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2). At the time this statute was enacted, CD Radio (now Sirius Satellite
Radio) and American Mobile Radio Corporation (now XM Satellite Radio) had purchased licenses
from the FCC and had begun developing their satellite radio systems. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 46, § 8.22[D][1][6].
138 See generaly 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 46, § 8.22 (discussing digital transmission rights
in sound recordings).
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guarantees that broadcasters of sound recordings, such as satellite radio
companies, will receive a license to perform sound recordings through a digital
transmission, as long as the broadcaster pays the royalties required under the
statute.139 In order for a performance of sound recordings by a satellite radio
company to qualify for a statutory license, certain requirements must be met: (i)
the transmission cannot be part of an interactive service; (ii) the broadcaster
cannot intentionally cause the recipient's equipment to automatically switch from
one channel to another; (iii) the transmission must contain specific information
about the copyrighted work; (iv) the transmission cannot exceed the sound
recording performance complement;" 4 and (v) the broadcaster may not publish
an advance program schedule or make announcements of specific sound
recordings or phonorecords to be transmitted."' Section 114(d)(3) provides
terms for the licensing of transmissions of sound recordings by interactive
services. 42 Finally, § 114(d)(4) states that (i) nothing within § 114 limits the
exclusive right to perform a sound recording publicly via digital audio
transmission, 143 (ii) § 114 does not limit the exclusive right to publicly perform a
musical work under § 106(4),14 and (iii) the limitation on performance rights of
sound recordings described within § 106(6) does not prevent copyright owners
from exercising their other exclusive rights contained in § 106.141
c. 17 U..C § 115: DigitalPhonorecordDefivegy. The DPRA also expanded
the reproduction and distribution rights held by copyright owners under § 115 of
the Copyright Act."4 .Among other things, the DPRA amended the mechanical
compulsory license under § 115 to give a compulsory licensee the right to
reproduce and distribute or authorize the distribution of a sound recording by
means of digital transmission.147 The DPRA also set forth how royalties are to

"I S.REP. No. 104-128, at 24, repintedin1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 371; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(o
(defining the Royalty payment provisions for the transmission of sound recordings).
140 The sound recording performance complement restricts the number of times broadcasters
can perform a particular sound recording, several selections from the same album of an artist, several
sound recordings from the same artist, or different recordings from a compilation album within a
certain time period. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140)(13).
141 Id. § 114(d)(2)(A)-(B).
142 Id. § 114(d)(3).
143 Id. § 114(d)(4)(a).
144 Id. § 114(d)(4)(C).

141 Id. §
146
147

114(d)(4)(C).

2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[A].
H.R. REP. 104-274, at 37-38 (1995); see also 2 NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23 [A] [1]

(stating that the compulsory license essentially allows any party to reproduce their own version of
a musical work, such as a song, once the work has been released to the public, without obtaining the
explicit permission of the copyright owner). A "mechanical license" is a grant of the right to
produce and release a copyrighted work in exchange for a royalty based on the number of units
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be paid when a musical work is reproduced and distributed through a digital
transmission.'4"
Under § 115, the digital distribution of a sound recording created under a
A
compulsory license constitutes a "digital phonorecord delivery."' 49
"phonorecord" is a material object where sounds are fixed and from which the
sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated through a machine or
device (such as a cassette tape, CD, etc.).' ° A digital phonorecord delivery is
"each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital transmission of a sound
recording that results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by or for any
The
transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording .... ))151
DPRA Senate Report explains that a "specifically identifiable reproduction" is one
that the transmitting service, and not simply the recipient, can identify." 2 This
implies that the mere private copying of a sound recording from a digital
transmission does not result in a digital phonorecord delivery.5 3 A transmission
of a sound recording or the underlying musical work can be characterized as a
digital phonorecord delivery even if the transmission is part of a public
performance of the sound recording or musical work.1' 4 However, any
transmission of a sound recording made from a real-time, noninteractive
subscription transmission where no copy of the transmission is made throughout
the entire performance of the sound recording is not a digital phonorecord
delivery.' 5 Moreover, the fact that a recipient of a transmission, through actions
on their own, records all or part of the programming from the service does not
necessarily render the transmission a digital phonorecord delivery. 5 6
Digital phonorecord delivery of sound recordings is permissible only if (i) the
copyright owner of the sound recording has authorized the delivery and (ii) the
copyright owner of the sound recording, or the entity making the delivery, has
obtained a compulsory license or has been authorized by the copyright owner of
the underlying musical work to distribute or authorize distribution of each musical
' Basically, this means
work embodied in the sound recording via digital delivery. 57

manufactured and sold." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 939 (8th ed. 2004).
148 H.R. REP. 104-274, at 37-41.
149 2 NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[A][2].
150 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
151 2 NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[A][2] (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2000)).
152 S. REP. No. 104-128, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 391; 2 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[A][3] n.12.
153 2 NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[A][3] n.12.
154

17 U.S.C. § 115(d); 2 NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 46,

8.23[A][2].

155 17 U.S.C. § 115(d); 2 NIMfiER & NIMMER, supra note 46, 8.23[A][2].
156 S.REP. No. 104-128, at 45; 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[A][2].

"1717 U.S.C. § 115().
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that those who wish to digitally deliver phonorecords legally must receive
permission to deliver each phonorecord, either through negotiations with the
copyright owner or through the compulsory license.'
The DPRA makes it clear that nothing contained within § 115 annuls or limits
the exclusive right to perform a sound recording or musical work embodied
within the recording, including by means of digital transmission.19 Additionally,
because the liability exemption of § 1008 of the AHRA could be interpreted as
immunizing some digital phonorecord delivery activities, the DPRA expressly
limits 5 1008 to prevent it from covering digital phonorecord delivery. 6 '
However, to keep those protected by the AHRA from being liable for
unauthorized digital phonorecord delivery under § 115, the DPRA explicitly
immunizes producers, distributors, importers, and users of audio recording
technology. 6' This means that copyright owners will not be able to bring
infringement actions under § 115 against those who manufacture, import, or
distribute digital audio recording equipment, or against consumers for their
personal use of that technology; however, copyright owners can still take action
against other parties involved in unauthorized digital phonorecord delivery. 62
E. ATL4NIC V. XM: CONTENTIONS ON BOTH SIDES

1. The Plaintiffs'Posiion.The plaintiffs allege that XM, through the Inno, has
created a service that permits the company to engage in the unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of the plaintiffs' sound recordings. 63 They contend

"s

2 NIAMER& NIAMNER, supra note 46, § 8.23[3][1].
To give a concrete example, imagine that Composer in 1980 authorizes Star to
perform and sell copies to the public of her newly written Song. Thereafter in
1990, Upstart may invoke the compulsory license to assemble musicians to
record his own version of Song; Upstart must pay compulsory license fees to
Composer, with no obligation to Star. Now imagine that Techie in 1997 wishes
to avail itself of the newly added compulsory license to offer digital
phonorecord delivery. Techie must remit the statutory fee to Composer for use
of the music. Techie may use Star's or Upstart's sound recording only if it
concludes a license agreement with either; absent successful licensing
arrangements, Techie may wish to assemble its own musicians and singers (or
cyberian facsimiles thereof) to record a new rendition of Song, which will then
be the subject of digital phonorecord delivery. In that last instantiation, Techie
will owe statutory license fees to Composer, and nothing to Star or Upstart.

Id.
159 Id
160 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(1); 2 NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[3][4].

17 U.S.C. § 115(3)(c)(1); 2 NIMMER & NIAMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[B][4].
2 NIMMER & NIMnER, spra note 46, § 8.23[B] [4].
63 Complaint, supra note 3, at 1-2, 15--17.
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162
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that this service violates XM's statutory license under § 114.1' In their response
to XM's motion to dismiss the complaint, the plaintiffs also argue that the AHRA
does not immunize XM from suit for this alleged activity because (i) the AHRA
liability exemptions do not apply to XM's alleged distribution service16 and (ii)
even if the Al-RA liability exemptions were applicable, the Inno is not a device
6
covered by the AHRA." "
a. XM's Use ofthe Inno Infringes on Plainiffs'ExclusiveRights to DistributeTheir
Copyrighted Works. The plaintiffs argue that the Inno and its ability to record
individual digital music tracks broadcast via an XM signal constitute an
unauthorized digital music distribution service."'7 According to the plaintiffs, XM
is using the Inno to make available and distribute digital copies of the plaintiffs'
68
copyrighted sound recordings through this system without their permission.
They argue that this new service is a violation of XM's statutory license because
§ 114 only grants XM permission to publicly perform-meaning permission only
to broadcast-the plaintiff's copyrighted works.'69
b. The AHRA Does Not Immuni.Ze XM's Conduct. In their opposition to
XM's Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiffs contend that while § 1008 of the AHRA
does provide for a limited immunity for companies that produce, distribute, and
import digital audio recording devices,7 ° this limited exception does not
immunize XM's conduct. The plaintiffs maintain that the unlawful conduct is not
XM's distribution of the Inno or consumers' use of the device-claims that
would be barred under § 1008, but rather that XM has created a system that
distributes copies of sound recordings. 1
Furthermore, according to the
plaintiffs, § 1008 cannot immunize XM's conduct because this would conflict with
the requirements of XM's statutory license because § 114 explicidy prohibits
satellite radio companies from reproducing or distributing sound recordings as
17
part of their service.

164

Id. at 1-2.

161

Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 8-14, Atlantic Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite

Radio, No. 06 CV 3733 (DAB) (GWG) (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition].
166

Id. at 17-21.

167

Complaint, supra note 3, at 2. The plaintiffs claim that XM has marketed the Inno in

conjuction with its XM + MP3 service. Id at 10-15. As of now, there is no reference to any XM
+ MP3 service on XM's website or marketing materials for the Inno. See The Pioneer Inno, http://
www.xmradio.com/pioneerinno/index.xmc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007); Pioneer Electronics, Inno
§ Product Overview, http://www.pioneerelectronics.com (follow "Home Entertainment: Personal
Electronics" hyperlink; then follow "Inno" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
16 Complaint, spra note 3, at 15-18.
169 Id. at 18-32.
170

17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).

171

Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 165, at 8-14.

172

Id. at 14-17.
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c. The Inno DoesNotFallUndertheAHRA. The plaintiffs also contend that
the Inno is not a digital audio recording device under the AHRA because the Inno
is incapable of making true digital audio copied recordings. Under their theory,
for a device to be able to make a digital audio copied recording as defined within
the AHRA, both the source recording and reproduction of the source made by
the device must be a digital musical recording. The plaintiffs claim that the Inno's
recording capabilities fail to meet either of these requirements.' 73
First, the plaintiffs point out that the statutory language of the AHRA, its
legislative history, and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the AHRA in Diamond
all imply that digital musical recordings can only be contained on some sort of
physical media, such as CDs or digital audio tapes.'74 They note that the
definition of digital musical recording excludes material objects that contain
computer programs, including computer hard drives and computer-like
memory. 7 Accordingly, under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the definition
of digital musical recordings, plaintiffs contend that the Inno is not a digital audio
recording device because it does in fact make recordings on computer-like
memory.'7 6 The plaintiffs also suggest that the actual recordings transmitted via
the XM broadcast may not qualify as digital musical recordings under the AHRA,
and therefore the Inno cannot make digital audio copied recordings.177 According
to the plaintiffs, if the sound recordings broadcast by XM are stored on a
centralized computer or object containing computer programs, then the
transmitted recordings are not actual digital musical recordings.'78 Therefore,
recording device since
under the plaintiffs' rationale, the Inno is not a digital audio
79
recordings.
music
digital
true
of
copies
make
cannot
it
2. The Defendant'sPosition. XM disputes the plaintiffs' claim that the Inno and
its functionality constitute an interactive service that allows Inno users to illegally
download songs. 80 XM and amid argue that the AHRA permits XM and other
manufacturers of digital audio recording devices to produce and distribute devices
such as the Inno,' 8' and that the legislative intent behind the statute supports this
assertion.' 82

113

Id. at 17-22.

174 Id.
175 Id

178

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.

179

Id.

176

177

"0oId at 8-11,

16-17.

Memorandum, supra note 7, at 13-15; Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 12-16.
182 Memorandum, supra note 7, at 17-21; Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 2-8.

181
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a. XM Has Not Createda DigitalMusic DistributionService in Violation of Its
f 114 Statutory License. XM contends that the Inno used with the XM broadcast
is not a digital music distribution service, and thus XM is not in breach of its
statutory license to broadcast the plaintiffs' copyrighted works.'83 Both XM and
amici allege that the plaintiffs' claim that the Inno's functionality constitutes an
interactive service is a blatant attempt to circumvent the AHRA. s4
XM maintains that the Inno is not an interactive service because users do not
have the ability to select which sound recordings are broadcast to their device.'8 5
In addition, unlike traditional digital music distribution services, XM contends
that the Inno does not actually download, and XM does not distribute, sound
recordings.'86 According to XM, using the Inno's recording function is analogous
to recording from an analog radio broadcast with a cassette tape recorder, or
recording a television broadcast with a VCR for private use-both of which are
permissible under existing copyright law.'87
b. TheAHRA Covers the Inno. In its motion to dismiss, XM maintains that
it is immunized from liability under the AHRA because the plain language of
§ 1008 prohibits any infringement actions based on the manufacture, distribution,
importation, or consumer use of a digital audio recording device.' 88 Therefore,
according to XM, even if the conduct alleged by the plaintiffs constitutes
copyright infringement, XM is not liable for the infringement because the device
meets the requirements of a digital audio recording device under the AHRA.189
XM claims that the Inno meets the definition of a digital audio recording
device as defined within § 1001 (3) for a number of reasons.' 90 First, because XM
sells the Inno directly to consumers, the device is commonly distributed to
individuals. 9 ' Secondly, the Inno is used by individual XM subscribers, thus
meeting the requirement that it be a device used by individuals. 92 Thirdly, the
primary purpose of the Inno's recording function is to allow users to make copies

3
Memorandum, supra note 7, at 8-9.
l84 Id.at 1-2; Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 1 n.3, 2.
185 Memorandum, supra note 7, at 9.

'86

Id. at 10-11.

187 Id.

According to the United States Supreme Court in Sony v. UniversalStudios, in creating a
limited copyright in sound recordings within the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress did not intend to
restrain the common practice of recording from broadcasts, tapes, or records for private use. Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studies, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 470-74 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at
7 (1971)), reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572.
188 Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2, 13.
189

Id.

190 Id. at 14-16.
191 Id. at 14.
192 Id. at 15.
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of digital musical recordings for their private use. 93 Finally, XM claims that the
recordings made by the Inno are in fact digital audio copied recordings because
they are fixed in a digital
recording format, and because they are made indirectly
94
from a transmission.
XM and amici also contend that 5 1008 of the AHRA was designed to prohibit
copyright infringement claims based on then-existing, as well as future, types of
digital audio recording technology, including devices such as the Inno. 19s In
addition, amici argue that the AHRA provides sufficient compensation to the
plaintiffs based on the use of digital audio recording technology, given the royalty
payments that manufacturers are required to pay.'96
III. ANALYSIS
A. ATLANTIC V. XM LITIGATION

The Atlantic v. XM litigation revolves around two key issues: (i) whether the
AHRA and its statutory immunity applies to XM given the Inno's recording
features; and if not, (ii) whether the Inno and its functions constitute an
unauthorized digital music distribution service. If the court finds that the Inno
is simply a legitimate digital audio recording device, then XM, as a distributor of
the Inno, is immune from suit for the non-commercial use of the device by
consumers.' 97 However, if the court rules that the Inno's functionality used in
conjunction with the XM broadcast signal amounts to a digital music distribution
service, then XM is actually distributing copies of the plaintiffs' copyrighted
sound recordings, and therefore XM is in violation of its statutory license to
perform the plaintiffs' copyright works under § 114(d)(2) of the Copyright Act.198
1. The Inno Does Not Safi.Ty theAHRA Requirementsfor a DigitalAudioRecording
Device. Given the design aspects and features of the Inno, XM has a strong
argument that the Inno is in compliance with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of an AHRA digital audio recording device, as stated in Diamond. However, a
close evaluation of the Inno and its features reveals that the Inno, a device similar
to the Rio in many respects, falls outside the purview of the AHRA for a number
of reasons. First, the Irmo is incapable of making copies directly from digital
musical recordings. Secondly, the Inno cannot make digital copies of recordings
193 Id.
194 Id. at 15-16.
195 Id. at 19-20; Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 2-6, 8-12.
196 Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 6-7.

197 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
19' Seegenerall 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (explaining the requirements for a statutory license under

§ 114 for certain transmissions, including satellite radio transmissions).
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from a transmission. Finally, the primary purpose of the Inno's recording
function is not to reproduce musical copies of digital musical recordings.
a. The Inno CannotMake DigitalAudio CopiedRecordings Directyfrom Digital
Musical Recordings. The Inno does not make copies directly from digital audio
recordings. Similar to the Rio discussed in Diamond,the Inno cannot copy audio
recordings directly from physical media, such as CDs, tapes, mini discs, or digital
audio tapes.' 99 Furthermore, just like users of the Rio, Inno users can transfer
digital audio files from their computer hard drive to the Inno with the use of a
computer program."°° In addition, the Inno stores its copied recordings on its
internal, computer-like memory.
The text and legislative history of the AHRA support the Ninth Circuit's, and
the plaintiffs', interpretation of the AHRA with respect to digital audio recording
devices.2 ' The AHRA was designed to protect those who manufacture and
distribute devices that permit consumers to make personal copies of sound
recordings contained onpbysicalmedia, where the resulting copies are fixed only on
physicalmedia. The House and Senate reports on the AHRA substantiate the fact
that the drafters made a conscious effort to exclude sound recordings contained
on computers, computer hard drives, or computer-like memory from the
definition of digital musical recording. This means that digital musical recordings,
whether encoded directly onto a computer hard drive (such as an MP3 file) or
transferred from physical media (such as a CD or digital audio tape) onto a
computer hard drive, are no longer digital musical recordings under the AHRA
definition.
Given the current AHRA language and Congress's statements clearly defining
the context and meaning of this language, the sound recordings made by the Inno
cannot be considered digital musical recordings for AHRA purposes for two
reasons. First, the internal storage of the Inno is a form of computer-like
memory.20 2 Similar to the Rio's storage medium, the Inno's memory stores data
similar to that of computer hard drives or computer memory."' ° Both the Senate
199 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.

1999) ("m[The Rio does not record 'directly' from 'digital music recordings'...."); see also id. at 1075
("The Rio... is incapable of receiving audio files from anything other than a personal computer
equipped with Rio Manager."). See general# PIONEER, supra note 2, at 26-78 (no reference to
recording directly from physical media).
200 See PIONEER, spra note 2, at 51, 54, 59.
201 Although the Diamonddecision is not binding precedent in this litigation, given that Diamond
is the leading interpretation and discussion of the AHRA, that case should serve as strong persuasive
precedent for the district court to consider. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; Needham,
supra note 88, at 1150 (noting that there was no case law interpreting the AHRA prior to the

Diamond litigation).

202 See PIONEER, supra note 2, at

203 Id.

77, 83.

The user guide specifically states that the storage capacity of the built-in memory is 1
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and the Ninth Circuit have stated that recordings fixed on computer memory do
not constitute digital musical recordings. 2" Second, the Inno User Guide
indicates that the device's memory contains at least one computer program. °5
The internal memory of the Inno contains "firmware," which is a series of
computer files and programs that help a device to function properly. 2 6 Since the
material object where the Inno stores sound recordings contains one or more
computer programs, and because this memory is the only place where the Inno
stores sound recordings, none of the recordings fixed to the Inno's internal
memory can be digital musical recordings.
b. The Inno Is Incapable of Making DigitalMusical Recordings '1ndirectyfrom a
Transmission." Since the actual copies made by the device are not digital musical
recordings, the Inno cannot make digital audio copied recordings indirectly from
a transmission. The plaintiffs also contend that the Inno cannot make digital
musical recordings from a transmission because the source recording itself may
not be a digital musical recording, 27 an argument based on a strict application of
the statutory language of the AHRA. If XM does in fact store its broadcasted
recordings on a computer hard drive, then under the current AHRA language, the
plaintiffs are correct.
The Inno cannot make digital audio copied recordings if XM does not in fact
transmit true digital musical recordings. Both the text and the legislative history
of the AHRA support the proposition that digital musical recordings are only
those recordings fixed on physical media. Thus, for a device to reproduce a
digital musical recording from a transmission, the transmitted recording itself
must originate from some sort of physical media, such as CDs or digital audio
tapes. For example, if XM were to broadcast a sound recording directly from a
CD and the Inno were to make a physical copy of this recording from the
broadcast, this recording activity would be covered by the AHRA (the Senate
report directly states this as a permissible activity). 20 However, if the sound
recordings that are broadcast by XM are fixed on a computer hard drive or

Gigabyte. Id.
at 83. This storage system is identical to what computer hard drives and memory use
to store data.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 170, 578 (11th ed. 2003)

(Explaining that a "byte" is "a unit of computer information or data storage capacity," and that a
"gigabyte is equivalent to one billion bytes").
204 S. REP. No. 102-294, at 46 (1992); Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1078.
205 PIONEER, supra note 2, at

64, 83.

See MERRiAM-WEBsTER's, supranote 203, at 472; Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.
corn/browse/firmware (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
7 Plaintiff's Opposition, supra note 165, at 21 n.3.
208 See S. REP. No. 102-294, at 47 ("Thus, a digital audio recording made from a commercially
released compact disc or audio cassette, or from a radio broadcast of a commercially released
compact disc or audio cassette, would be a 'digital audio copied recording.' ").
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computer-like memory, this means that the transmitted recordings are not actual
digital musical recordings. Therefore, if the Inno makes copies of broadcasted
recordings stored on a central computer, than it is not actually making copies of
true digital music recordings. Ultimately, additional discovery will reveal exactly
how XM stores the digital musical recordings used during its broadcasts, and
whether that mode of storage provides another reason why the Inno is not
covered by the AHRA.
c. The 'PrimaryPurpose" of the Inno's RecordingFunction Is Not Marketed and
UsedforMakingDigitalAudioCopiedRecordings. The recording function of the Inno
also fails the primary purpose test for a number of reasons. First, since the Inno
stores recordings on a computer-like memory, the recordings made by the Inno
do not constitute digital audio copied recordings. Therefore, the primary purpose
of the Inno's recording function is to make objects other than digital audio copied
recordings. As the Senate report clearly states, this type of device cannot
constitute a digital audio recording device. 0 9 Second, the Inno is heavily
marketed as an MP3 player, and XM touts the fact that users can copy MP3 and
other digital audio files from their computer to the device.210 In fact, the internal
memory of the Inno can be divided in such a way that the majority of the internal
memory is designated for storing digital audio files copied from the user's
computer.211 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the AHRA in
Diamond states that making copies of digital audio files that originate on a
computer hard drive does not amount to making digital musical recordings.212 All
of these factors illustrate that the recording function of the Inno is neither capable
of, nor marketed for, the primary purpose of making digital audio copied
213
recordings for personal use.
2. The Inno Usedin Conjunctionwith the XMBroadcastDoesNot BreachXM's f 114
Statutory License. XM has been granted a statutory license under § 114 to broadcast
sound recordings owned by the plaintiffs and others.21 4 An interactive service,
however, is not eligible for a § 114 statutory license, and operators of these

2o9 Id.
210

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
supra note 2, at 77.
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1098 (9th Cir.

211 PIONEER,

212

1999).

Since the recording function fails the primary purpose test, determiningwhether the function
is used to make copies for noncommercial private use is irrelevant. With that said, the device easily
passes this test, since the Inno is incapable of making second generation copies. Furthermore, copies
213

of sound recordings made from an XM broadcast cannot be transferred from the Inno. This means
that only the user of the device can listen to the recordings and there is no way for the user to make
multiple copies to sell. See PIONEER, supra note 2 (explaining the recording capabilities and
limitations of the Inno).
214 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000); 2 NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 46, § 8.23[A][3].
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services must instead obtain a license from the copyright owner to perform each
individual sound recording.215 A thorough review of the Inno's features and how
the XM broadcast signal is integrated with the Inno reveals that the XM signal in
conjunction with the Inno does not constitutes an interactive or digital music
distribution service. Therefore, XM is not in violation of its statutory license and
should not be held liable for copyright infringement for the performances of the
plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings that are received by Inno users.
a. The Inno Used with the XM Broadcast Is Not an 'nteractive Service." It is
clear that the Inno used with the XM services is not an interactive service. The
plaintiffs allege that the XM broadcast used with the Inno provides the same
service as legitimate distribution services-perfect digital copies of the plaintiffs'
sound recordings-and that using the Inno to copy recordings is no different
than downloading songs from these services.216 However, unlike the individual
song request features of traditional audio-on-demand services, such as Napster,
Rhapsody, and Urge, the Inno does not permit users to request that specific songs
be played by XM.217 Only XM has control over the sound recordings that are
performed during its broadcasts. The Inno simply allows the user to make copies
of these recordings and other broadcasted material. Moreover, the other
legitimate digital music distribution services allow users to copy any song within
their catalog, on demand. Inno users, however, cannot select specific songs
within XM's catalog to copy.
Additionally, while the XM + Napster service is a true interactive service and
the Inno can play songs purchased from Napster, this alone is not enough to call
the Inno used in conjunction with XM services an interactive service. Section 114
states that if an entity offers both interactive and noninteractive services, "the
'
noninteractive component shall not be treated as part of an interactive service."218
Here, the Inno can be used entirely separate from the XM + Napster service.
The lnno's documentation and marketing materials suggest that the Inno is a
passive, non-interactive device that simply receives and decrypts the XM signal

215
216
217

17 U.S.C. § 114.
Plaintiffs' Opposition, rupra note 165, at 6.
Even if XM users could call in to request specific songs to be broadcast, this does not make

the XM broadcast an interactive service. See 17 U.S.C. § 1140) ("The ability of individuals to request
that a particular sound recording be performed by the public at large, or in the case of a subscription
service, by all subscribers of the service, does not make a service interactive, if the programming on
each channel of the service does not substantially consist of sound recordings performed within 1
hour of the request or at a time designated by either the transmitting entity or the individual making
the request."); S. REP. No. 104-128, at 33-34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 380-81
(explaining that the term "interactive service" does not cover traditional radio station practices, such
as allowing listeners to call in and request that certain songs be played over the air).
218 17 U.S.C. § 1140).
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and provides recording capabilities.2 19 Nothing in the documentation suggests
that the Inno itself sends any requests or communicates with any of XM's
systems. 20 Since the Inno meets none of the requirements of an interactive
service, the fact that XM markets, distributes, and broadcasts its signal to the Inno
is not a violation of its 5 114 statutory license. Furthermore, given that Napster
is an interactive service, the company is required under 5 114 and 5 115 of the
Copyright Act to negotiate a license with the copyright owners of the sound
recordings that are transmitted through its service. Accordingly, the fact that the
Inno can play recordings transmitted from the Napster service does not amount
to a violation of XM's 5 114 statutory license.
b. XM Does Not Engage in DigitalPhonorecordDeivery Through Use of the Inno.
In addition to not being an interactive service, the Inno used together with XM
services does not comprise a digital phonorecord delivery service. While the Inno
does allow for the user to make digital copies of sound recordings transmitted by
XM, nothing in the device's documentation suggests that the copied recordings
are "specifically identifiable" by XM. 221' The Inno simply allows users to make
copies of sound recordings and other material transmitted via an XM broadcast.
The Senate report specifically points out that just because a subscriber to a noninteractive subscription transmission makes copies of transmitted material on
their own accord, this in itself does not make the transmission a digital
phonorecord delivery. 222 The fact that the Inno permits users to schedule
recordings does not mean that XM itself is engaging in digital phonorecord
delivery. Accordingly, since the recording function of the Inno is designed only
for the specific purpose of allowing consumers to copy transmitted content and
does not allow users to select individual songs to download, the XM broadcast
used with the Inno clearly is not a digital phonorecord delivery service.

219 See generally PIONEER, supra note 2 (providing a thorough description of the Inno's features,

making no mention of any way that the Inno sends data or other communication to XM).
220 Id.
221 Ultimately more discovery will reveal whether XM can track which recordings are actually
copied by the Inno. One possible argument that the recordings are specifically identifiable by XM
is that the XM + Napster service sends certain usage statistics to XM for informational purposes and
part of this information includes songs copied by users. For example, if an audio-on-demand service
allows users to download individual songs and keeps a record of which songs a user downloads and
when the songs were downloaded, the service would be able to specifically identify any recordings
transmitted by the service. Furthermore, since the Inno can be used separately from the XM +
Napster service, the device is capable of making recordings that would not be reported to XM.
2"
S. REP. No. 104-128, at 45.
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B. A NEED FOR CHANGE WITHIN THE AHRA

The probable outcome of the XM litigation, as well as the differing opinions
in the Diamondcase,illustrate that the AHRA is in desperate need of reformation.
Although Congress may have intended for the AHRA to provide consumers with
"access to the latest digital audio recording technology" and to "cover future as
well as then-existing technologies, ' '223 the statutory language is too vague to
accomplish that aim. The AHRA also fails to provide copyright owners adequate
compensation and protection against the unauthorized copying of their
copyrighted works. Finally, in its current form, the overly confusing language of
the AHRA provides little guidance to producers of digital audio recording
technology or the courts. These issues can be rectified by making simple changes
to the AHRA.
1. The AHRA is Too Narrow to Be Effective. In drafting the language of the
AHRA, Congress limited the definition of digital musical recording to material
objects in which only sounds are fixed. This limited definition encompasses only
those sound recordings fixed in a digital format on physical media (CDs, DATs,
DCC, etc.). However, the majority of digital sound recordings and copies of
sound recordings are no longer fixed on physical media; instead, they are fixed in
compressed digital audio format files stored on computer memory, such as MP3,
WIA, and AAC, and stored as digital audio files on computer hard drives and
other computer-like memory.224
The statutory language and legislative history of the AHRA reveal that when
the drafters enacted the AHRA, they did not envision the potential for musical
recordings to be reproduced and stored onto computer hard drives and
computer-like memory.225 Since MP3s and other digital musical files are often
fixed on objects that contain one or more computer programs, such as computer
hard drives or computer-like memory, and not solely on physical media, these
digital audio files do not fall within the AHRA's definition of digital musical
recording. As a result, the majority of portable music players and other devices
that make copies of musical recordings are not covered by the AHRA.
2. The AHRA Provides Copyright Owners with Inadequate Compensation and
Protection. While the AHRA was enacted in part to provide consumers access to
digital audio recording technology, it was also intended to provide compensation
to copyright owners for the reduction in music sales that home recording would

Memorandum, supra note 7, at 19.
4 Adrian, supra note 22.
z See Needham, supra note 88, at 1143 ("Understandably, the explosion of digital musical
transmission was not foreseen in 1992 when the [AHRA] was passed.')
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cause. 22 6 Additionally, the AHRA-imposed copy controls were designed to
provide protection against the mass distribution of copyrighted digital musical
recordings.227 The computer hard drive exception loophole that the Ninth Circuit
read into the AHRA in Diamond,22 ' however, effectively denies copyright owners
both adequate compensation for and protection from copyright infringement
caused widespread home recording. Since the vast majority of musical recording
devices create digital audio recordings on computer hard drives and computer
memory, under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the AHRA, most digital
audio recording devices are not covered by the AHRA. This means that
producers of MP3 and other digital audio players are not required to make any
royalty payments for the devices they produce, even though these devices are used
to make numerous unauthorized copies of sound recordings. In addition,
producers are free to create and distribute digital audio recording devices with no
serial copy protection as long as the device does not fix the digital recordings onto
physical media.
3. The AHRA Creates Confusion. In the Diamond litigation, the district court
and the Ninth Circuit evaluated the same device under the AHRA and came to
completely opposite conclusions as to what constitutes a digital audio recording
device. Despite the exhaustive Congressional record discussing the AHRA and
its provisions, the district court found that the Rio was a digital audio recording
device, while the Ninth Circuit held that the Rio was not a digital audio recording
device. 2 9 Although the district court in the XM litigation should find that the
Inno is not a digital audio recording device, given the AHRA's vague statutory
language, both that court and a subsequent appellate court could potentially
disagree with the Ninth Circuit's AHRA interpretation, thus causing a division
among the circuits on what technology is covered by the AHRA.
4. Proposed Solution. There is no doubt that the AHRA has created much
confusion and is arguably not achieving its purpose, as evidenced by the Diamond
case and now the XM litigation. Therefore, it is imperative that Congress take
action to amend the AHRA. In doing so, Congress must be careful not to create
legislation that substantially impairs consumers' rights to use digital audio
recording technology.

22 S. REP. No. 102-294, at 30 (1992); H.R. REP. No. 102-873(11), at 2, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3601.
227 S. REP. No. 102-294, at 30; H.R. REP. NO. 102-873(11), at 2.

" Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1077-79 (9th
Cir. 1999).
2 See 180 F.3d 1073-81 (discussing why the Rio was not digital audio recording device under
the AHRA); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F. Supp. 624, 627-32
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining why the Rio satisfied the requirements of an AHRA digital audio
recording device).
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One potential change would be to remove the terms "digital musical
recording," "digital audio copied recording," "digital audio recording medium,"
and "digital audio recording device" from the AHRA and replace them with less
complicated terminology. For instance, the Canadian Private Copyright Collective
(CPCC)230 has recently proposed legislation similar to the AHRA, which places
a tariff on digital audio recording technology and media.231 Under the CPCC's
proposed law,
"blank audio recording medium" means
(a)a recording medium, regardless of its material form, onto which
a sound recording may be reproduced, that is of a kind ordinarily
used by individual consumers for that purpose and on which no
sounds have ever been fixed, including
(i) audio cassettes (1/8 inch tape) of 40 minutes or more in
length;
(ii) recordable compact discs (CD-R, CD-RW, CD-R Audio,
CD-RW Audio);
(iii) MiniDiscs;
(iv) Removable electronicmemogy cards in the Secure Digital,MuliMedia,
and Memory Stick formats with more than 256 MBs of memoy;
(v) digital audio recorders; and
(vi) any medium prescribed by regulations pursuant to sections
79 and 87 of the [Copyright] Act
"digital audio recorder" means a medium that is designed,
manufactured, advertised and primarily used for copying sound
recordings of musical works and is capable of being used to play
sound recordings of musical works... 232
This bill places a sliding-scale tariff on removable media and digital audio
size of the media/recorder, capping the tariff
recorders based on the storage
233
amount after a certain point.

230 The CPCC is a Canadian nonprofit organization representing songwriters, music publishers,

and record companies that handles the collection and distribution of private copying royalties.
Canadian Private Copying Collective, About CPCC, http://cpcc.ca/english/about.htm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2007).
231 Copyright Board, Statement of ProposedLevies to Be Collected by CPCCon the Sale, In Canada, of
Blank Audio RecordingMediafor the Years 2008-2009, 141 CANADA GAZETTE, PART I (SUPPLEMENT

ToNo. 6) 3 (2007), aailabkeathttp://canadagazette.gc.ca/partd/2007/20070210/pdf/gl-14106.pdf.
232 Id.at 4 (emphasis added).
23' Id. at 4-5.
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The CPCC's proposed bill has a number of advantages over the AHRA. First,
unlike the vague and confusing terms used within the AHRA, the statutory
language of the CPCC proposal explicitly states what types of media and devices
are covered by the legislation. This language gives clear guidance to producers
and distributors of digital audio recording technology concerning the types of
recorders and media that are covered by the statute. Secondly, the CPCC's
proposed statute can easily be amended to address new developments in the
digital audio technology landscape through minor modifications. Finally, the
CPCC's proposed bill strikes a proper balance between the interests of copyright
owners and the consumer electronics industry. Copyright owners would receive
more compensation than under the AHRA because a royalty is assessed on MP3
players and other devices that play digital audio files. Computer hard drives,
however, are not covered by the statutory language, which would appease
computer hardware manufacturers.
Unless the AHRA is amended, consumers may eventually lose the audio home
recording rights that they now enjoy. Radio broadcasts are shifting to a digital
format, as evidenced by the introduction of both satellite and High-Definition
radio broadcasting formats. Moreover, most digital audio recording technology
fixes recordings on computer hard drives and computer-like memory. Therefore,
under the current statutory language of the AHRA, future consumers may be
denied the opportunity to use digital audio recording technology to make home
recordings from radio broadcasts. This loss of home recording rights does not
seem fair, especially given the fact that it is permissible for consumers to use
digital video recorders (DVRs), such as the TiVo, to record audio/video content
from a digital video broadcast. For these reasons, it is essential that Congress
amend the AHRA to cover all devices that are able to make digital audio
recordings, and thus provide consumers and copyright owners with an
appropriate degree of protection and compensation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Inno uses innovative digital technology to permit users to record
individual sound recordings and programs that are broadcast over the XM signal.
As long as the Inno user keeps their XM Radio subscription active, any songs that
they record can be stored for subsequent playback.
The AHRA was enacted to encourage the introduction of digital audio
recording technology. This legislation permits consumers to make digital copies
of sound recordings, and it immunizes manufacturers and distributors of digital
audio recording technology from liability resulting from the unlawful use of their
technology. Under the language of the AHRA, the Inno does not fall within the
purview of the AHRA. The AHRA only covers devices that are capable of
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making physical copies of digital musical recordings,' and the Inno is incapable of
doing so.
While the Inno does allow consumers to make digital copies of sound
recordings broadcast over the XM signal, this in itself does not make use of the
Inno a digital music distribution service.
First, the Inno is a passive,
noninteractive device. Unlike users of most digital music distribution services,
users of the Inno do not have the ability to choose any song to record; they can
but only record those songs that happen to be broadcast by XM. In addition,
Congress has stated that a legitimate broadcaster of sound recordings does not
digitally distribute sound recordings simply because individual users, are able to
make copies of recordings broadcast over a digital transmission. Therefore, while
the Inno is not a digital audio recording device that is protected by the AHRA, its
functions do not amount to a service that engages in the unauthorized
distribution of copyrighted works.
Despite Congress's intent, the AHRA has become an arguably meaningless
piece of legislation. Its narrow scope fails to fully compensate copyright owners
for the inevitable copyright infringement that home recording encourages, and it
does not go far enough to prevent unauthorized copying of copyrighted works.
Finally, the differing interpretations of the AHRA given by the district court and
the Ninth Circuit in Diamondserve as a clear example of why the AHRA needs to
be clarified. Accordingly, Congress should amend the AHRA in such a way that
it covers the private copying of all sound recordings, including recordings stored
on computer hard drives and other computer-like memory.
Kevin M. Dious
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